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I.

INTRODUCTION

It is a longstanding rule that partners in a general partnership can each
be held personally liable for the obligations of the partnership.1 To avoid

* Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law. J.D., University of Houston Law
Center; B.S. University of Missouri–Columbia. I would like to thank Professor Douglas Moll of
the University of Houston Law Center and Professor Mark Cochran of St. Mary’s University
School of Law for their valuable feedback on this article. I would also like to thank and
acknowledge the hard work and assistance of my research assistants Rusty Hoermann, Craig
Jacobs, Matt Johnson and Sarah Minter, in researching and writing this article. Finally, I would
like to thank my wife Jill, daughter Savannah, and son George for their love and support.
1
See Danning v. United States (In re Matter of Montgomery), 532 F.2d 725, 726 (9th Cir.
1976) (recognizing “the general rule that a general partner is personally liable for the debts of the
partnership”); First N.M. Bank v. Bruton (In re Bruton), Bankr. No. 7-09-13458 JA, 2010 WL
2737201, at *5 (Bankr. D.N.M. July 12, 2010) (writing that, in a general partnership, “all partners
are jointly and severally liable for the debts incurred by any one of the general partners”);
Teamsters Pension Trust Fund of Phila. & Vicinity v. Malone Realty Co. (In re Malone), 74 B.R.
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liability, many investors in a partnership prefer the structure of a limited
partnership, which generally insulates the limited partners from liability by
creating a two-tier structure with a general partner and limited partners.
The limited partners are at risk of losing only their investment so long as
they are not acting as general partners. However, a question which
frequently arises in this structure is: what duties are owed between the
various partners? In a general partnership, all partners are fiduciaries to
each other.2 The statutes governing limited partnerships make clear that
general partners in a limited partnership continue to owe fiduciary duties to
the limited partnership3 but what of limited partners? Do limited partners
owe duties to the limited partnership itself or to each other? In McBeth v.
Carpenter, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated quite boldly, “With
respect to fiduciary duties . . . Texas law recognizes such obligations
between limited partners, applying the same partnership principles that
govern the relationship between a general partner and limited partners.”4
Taken at face value, the McBeth decision appears to answer the question of
duties owed; however, a closer look at the cases relied upon by the McBeth
315, 319 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (“As a rule, general partners are personally liable for partnership
debts. At the same time, each partner has a right to have the partnership’s property applied to the
payment of the partnership debt.”); Kelly v. Fla. Dep’t of Ins., 597 So. 2d 900, 902 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1992) (noting that under Florida law, “[i]t is . . . well established that each general partner is
personally liable for all partnership obligations”).
2
See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404 (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001).
3
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.1408(1) (West 2007) (“The only fiduciary duties that a
general partner has to the limited partnership and the other partners are the duties of loyalty and
care . . . .”); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.204(a) (West Supp. 2010) (“A partner owes to
the partnership, the other partners, and a transferee of a deceased partner’s partnership interest as
designated in Section 152.406(a)(2): (1) a duty of loyalty; and (2) a duty of care.”); See Wallace
ex rel. Cencom Cable Income Partners II, L.P. v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1182 n.23 (Del. Ch.
1999) (“[I]t is well settled that, unless limited by the limited partnership agreement, the general
partner of a Delaware limited partnership and the directors of a corporate General Partner who
control the partnership, like directors of a Delaware corporation, have the fiduciary duty to
manage the partnership in the partnership’s interests and the interests of the limited partners.”);
Boxer v. Husky Oil Co., 429 A.2d 995, 997 (Del. Ch. 1981) (“When the provisions of the
Uniform Partnership Act and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act are read together, it is clear
that the general partner in a limited partnership owes a fiduciary duty to the limited partners . . . .
The duty of the general partner in a limited partnership to exercise the utmost good faith, fairness,
and loyalty is . . . required both by statute and common law. This fiduciary duty of partners is
often compared to that of corporate directors . . . .”); Red River Wings, Inc. v. Hoot, Inc., 751
N.W.2d 206, 219 (N.D. 2008) (“The statute imposes upon partners the duties of loyalty and care
and the obligations of good faith and fair dealing.”).
4
565 F.3d 171, 177 (5th Cir. 2009).
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court, other Texas opinions, and the facts of the McBeth case itself reveals
that such a broad statement may be misleading and inaccurate.
This article examines the question of what duties are owed among
limited partners in a limited partnership. Part II discusses both the uniform
and Texas statutes governing limited partnerships and their interplay with
the law of general partnerships. Part III focuses specifically upon the duties
owed by partners under both a general and limited partnership under Texas
law. Part IV examines the McBeth decision, concluding that though the
decision’s outcome is correct, the rule that should be extracted from the
case is much more nuanced than the broad statement that limited partners
owe fiduciary duties to one another. The article concludes that though
Texas jurisprudence has failed to articulate a clear rule, it is consistent with
the cases decided thus far and the nature of a limited partnership to only
create a fiduciary duty in certain equitable circumstances, such as when the
limited partner is exercising control over the limited partnership or is also
acting in the role of a general partner.

II.

GENERAL AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS IN TEXAS

Under the Texas Business Organizations Code’s general partnership
provisions, which substantially follow the Revised Uniform Partnership Act
(RUPA), the default status of two or more individuals entering into a joint
enterprise with the intention of making a profit is a general partnership.5
No filing with the state is required to obtain general partnership status, but
the entity does have legal consequences. For instance, unless specified
5

See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.051(b) (“[A]n association of two or more persons to
carry on a business for profit as owners creates a partnership, regardless of whether: (1) the
persons intend to create a partnership; or (2) the association is called a “partnership,” “joint
venture,” or other name.”); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 60
(2001) (similarly defining a partnership to mean “an association of two or more persons to carry
on as co-owners a business for profit formed under Section 202, predecessor law, or comparable
law of another jurisdiction”). Section 202 of RUPA also provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in subsection (b), the association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a
business for profit forms a partnership, whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership.”
REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202. This is true under Texas law as well. See Howard Gault &
Son, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Hereford, 541 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1976,
no writ) (“The statement in one of the agreements that the farming operation was not a partnership
is not conclusive on the question of partnership. It is the intent to do the things that constitute a
partnership that determines that the relationship exists between the parties, and if they intend to do
a thing which in law constitutes a partnership, they are partners whether their expressed purpose
was to create or avoid the relationship.”).
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otherwise in the partnership agreement, the partners in a general partnership
split profits equally, regardless of capital contributions.6 General partners
are also jointly and severally liable to third parties for partnership
liabilities.7 Thus, if A and B form a partnership to run a taco stand, and a
customer, C, becomes ill eating food from the stand, both A and B can be
held personally liable for the injury to C.
To avoid this result, many would-be partners opt instead to form a
limited partnership, or L.P. Unlike a general partnership, an L.P. must be
registered with the state. An L.P. has a two-tiered structure with a general
partner and at least one limited partner. Under the Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act (RULPA), which has also been adopted by Texas,
the limited partner is generally insulated from the liabilities of the L.P.
beyond its investment in the L.P.8 The general partner, however, remains
personally liable for the liabilities of the partnership just as it would in a
general partnership.9 The general partner is also charged with managing the
L.P., though RULPA does not explicitly prohibit limited partners from
taking part in and managing the L.P.10 However, RULPA does provide that
limited partners can lose their insulation from liability in some
circumstances if they are in fact controlling the L.P.11 The Texas Business
Organizations Code, which follows RULPA, provides:
(a) A limited partner is not liable for the obligations of a
limited partnership unless:
(1) the limited partner is also a general partner; or

6

TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.202(c).
Id. § 152.303.
8
REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303 (amended 1985), 6 U.L.A. 505 (Supp. 1995).
9
Id. § 403.
10
See id.
11
Id. Section 303 states:
7

Except as provided in subsection (d), a limited partner is not liable for the obligations of
a limited partnership unless he [or she] is also a general partner or, in addition to the
exercise of his [or her] rights and powers as a limited partner, he [or she] participates in
the control of the business. However, if the limited partner participates in the control of
the business, he [or she] is liable only to persons who transact business with the limited
partnership reasonably believing, based upon the limited partner’s conduct, that the
limited partner is a general partner.
Id. § 303.
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(2) in addition to the exercise of the limited
partner’s rights and powers as a limited partner, the
limited partner participates in the control of the
business.12
Thus, a limited partner who takes too active of a role in the management of
the L.P. could risk personal liability, but this liability is limited to those
individuals who reasonably believe the limited partner is a general partner.13
The Texas Business Organizations Code and RULPA also contain a laundry
list of activities that, in and of themselves, do not mean the limited partner
is in “control” of the L.P., such as “acting as: (A) a contractor for or an
officer or other agent or employee of the limited partnership; (B) a
contractor for or an agent or employee of a general partner; (C) an officer,
director, or stockholder of a corporate general partner;”14 “consulting with
or advising a general partner on any matter, including the business of the
limited partnership;”15 or “calling, requesting, attending, or participating in
a meeting of the partners or the limited partners.”16 The end result of these
provisions is that a limited partner who is a passive investor will be able to
reap the benefits of a profitable L.P without worrying about personal
liability, but even a limited partner who takes a larger role in the L.P. can
remain insulated from liability.

III. DUTIES OF LIMITED PARTNERS UNDER TEXAS LAW
A. Fiduciary Duties Under the Texas Business Organizations Code
Both RULPA and Texas law rely on a concept referred to as “linkage”
to fill in gaps in the limited partnership acts. This means that where the
limited partnership act does not address an issue, the law of the general
partnership act fills in the gap. This concept is important in the realm of
duties as both RULPA and Texas law refer simply to the general
partnership acts with regard to the duties of the general partner in a limited
partnership. The Texas Business Organizations Code (TBOC) Section
153.152 provides that:

12

TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 153.102(a) (West Supp. 2010).
See id. § 153.102(b).
14
Id. § 153.103(1)(A-C).
15
Id. § 153.103(3).
16
Id. § 153.103(5); REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303.
13
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(a) Except as provided by this chapter, the other limited
partnership provisions, or a partnership agreement, a
general partner of a limited partnership:
(1) has the rights and powers and is subject to the
restrictions of a partner in a partnership without
limited partners; and
(2) has the liabilities of a partner in a partnership
without limited partners to the partnership and to
the other partners.
(b) Except as provided by this chapter or the other limited
partnership provisions, a general partner of a limited
partnership has the liabilities of a partner in a partnership
without limited partners to a person other than the
partnership and the other partners.17
Thus, a general partner owes fiduciary duties to the limited partnership and
the limited partners.18 However, though it is clear that a general partner
owes fiduciary duties to the limited partners, what is less clear is whether
limited partners also owe such duties to the limited partnership itself and to
the other limited partners simply by virtue of their status as limited partners
within the same company.19
This uncertainty stems from this same concept of linkage. TBOC
Section 153.003(a) provides that “[e]xcept as provided by Subsection (b), in
a case not provided for by this chapter and the other limited partnership
provisions, the provisions of Chapter 152 governing partnerships that are
not limited partnerships and the rules of law and equity govern.”20 As the
TBOC does not explicitly negate the creation of fiduciary duties running
from a limited partner to the other limited partners, an argument can be
made that the duties owed in a general partnership also apply to limited

17

TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 153.152; REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 403.
See Hughes v. St. David’s Support Corp., 944 S.W.2d 423, 425–26 (Tex. App.—Austin
1997, writ denied) (“Furthermore, in a limited partnership, the general partner stands in the same
fiduciary capacity to the limited partners as a trustee stands to the beneficiaries of a trust.”).
19
See 19 ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., TEX. PRACTICE SERIES: BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
§ 14.33 (2d ed. 2004) (“There is some uncertainty with regard to whether limited partners owe
fiduciary duties to the partnership or other partners.”).
20
TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 153.003(a).
18
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partners.21 However, the TBOC goes on to provide that the “powers and
duties of a limited partner shall not be governed by [rules applicable to
general partnerships] that would be inconsistent with the nature and role of
a limited partner.”22 It also states that a “limited partner shall not have any
obligation or duty of a general partner solely by reason of being a limited
partner.”23 Given that one of the main purposes of entering into a limited
partnership is to avoid personal liability, it therefore seems more logical to
conclude that an individual’s mere status as a limited partner should not
impose fiduciary duties. This has prompted at least one commentator to
declare that “[t]he TBOC makes it clear that limited partners, as limited
partners, generally do not owe fiduciary duties to the partnership or to other
partners.”24
Sadly, despite the clarity of this statement, Texas case law has not been
as clear on this point. While there is limited case law on the topic, at least
two Texas cases have come down on the side of finding no such duty
simply by virtue of limited partner status, while two other opinions have
indicated that such a duty does exist. As will be explored, however, the
cases finding that such a duty does exist are more nuanced than a simple
statement that every limited partner owes a fiduciary duty to the other
partners and the limited partnership itself.

B. Cases Finding No Fiduciary Duty
Only two Texas cases addressing the duties owed by limited partners to
other partners have concluded that a partner’s status as a mere limited
partner does not necessarily give rise to a fiduciary duty. However, neither
case was reported and thus both lack precedential value.25 The reasoning of
the courts is nonetheless instructive as they seem to align with the
implications of Sections 153.003(a) & (b) of the TBOC in finding no such
duty.
21

See 19 HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 19, at § 14.33.
TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 153.003(b).
23
Id. § 153.003(c).
24
Byron F. Egan, Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors and Officers in Texas, 43 TEX. J.
BUS. L. 45, 341 (2009). Mr. Egan goes on to note that limited partners can have such duties
imposed upon them when “a limited partner actually has or exercises control in management
matters (e.g., because of control of the general partner, contractual veto powers over partnership
actions or service as an agent of the partnership).” Id.
25
See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.7(b) (noting that court of appeals opinions in civil cases have no
precedential value if issued before January 1, 2003 and designed as “do not publish”).
22
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In Crawford v. Ancira, Michelle Crawford sued Ernesto Ancira and
others for alleged misrepresentations made in connection with Crawford’s
acquisition of a limited partnership called Designer Cartel, Ltd. (Cartel).26
Eighty percent of Cartel was owned by Ancira as a limited partner and
twenty percent by M.M. Thomas, Inc., which acted as the general partner.27
Under the terms of a 1989 agreement, Crawford acquired M.M. Thomas,
Inc. and another thirty percent of Ancira’s interest making her the fifty
percent owner of Cartel.28 As part of the agreement, Crawford made a
$40,000 loan to Cartel and directed M.M. Thomas to make another $5,000
loan.29 In a subsequent 1991 agreement, Crawford then acquired Ancira’s
remaining interest in Cartel for ten dollars.30 Crawford subsequently sued
Ancira, among others, for making fraudulent misrepresentations regarding
both the 1989 and 1991 agreements.31 Crawford claimed that Cartel had
outstanding debts, contrary to the assertions of Ancira that Cartel had no
debts and that Ancira claimed he would pay any outstanding debts should
they exist.32 Unfortunately for Crawford, these alleged misrepresentations
were contrary to the terms of the 1989 and 1991 agreements, which
provided that the money loaned in 1989 would go toward paying
outstanding debts and that Crawford would release Ancira from any of
Cartel’s debts.33
Crawford admitted that she did not read the agreements but asserted that
she relied upon the representations of Ancira in entering into the contract.34
The Fourth Court of Appeals was unsympathetic to her claim, noting that in
an arm’s-length transaction, “[A] party who fails to read a contract may not
avoid the effect of the contract on the ground that she did not know what
she was signing.”35 However, the court noted that, if Ancira was in a
fiduciary relationship with Crawford, her reliance on Ancira’s statements

26
NO. 04-96-00078-CV, 1997 WL 214835, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio April 30, 1997, no
writ) (not designated for publication).
27
See id. at *1.
28
See id.
29
See id.
30
See id.
31
See id. at *1–2.
32
See id. at *4.
33
See id.
34
See id.
35
Id.
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would amount to fraud.36 Thus, the court reviewed whether Ancira’s status
as a limited partner gave rise to a fiduciary duty owed to other limited
partners.37 The court noted that though general partners owe such a duty to
the limited partners, limited partners lack the managerial powers that a
general partner wields.38 The court concluded that:
limited partners do not necessarily have a duty to act for or
give advice for the benefit of the other partners or a duty to
subordinate their own interests to the interests of the other
partners. . . . [A] person’s mere status as a limited partner is
insufficient to create fiduciary duties.39
The court therefore affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of
Ancira.40
The other case which espouses this same statement of the law is
factually more complicated. In AON Properties, Inc. v. Riveraine Corp.,
two individuals, William Signet and H.C. Smith, formed a limited
partnership in 1990 called Riveraine Development Ltd. (RDL) for the
purpose of renovating apartment complexes in Houston, Texas.41 The
general partner in RDL was Riveraine Corporation (who owned a one
percent interest in RDL), and the limited partners were Signet, Cope Smith,
CanAmerican Holdings, Inc. (a company controlled by individual David
Lobb) and Hemisphere Management, Inc. (a company controlled by Cope
Smith).42 After acquiring some of the necessary properties, RDL was in
need of additional capital and entered into a joint venture with AON
Properties, Inc. called Beechnut South Partnership (BSP).43 The project
continued to move forward.44 However, in 1992 AON claimed there was a
shortfall in RDL’s initial capital contribution.45 Also, Signet fell behind on
payments on a loan which had been required for some of the initial capital
36

See id.
See id. at *4–5.
38
See id. at *5.
39
Id.
40
See id. at *6.
41
No. 14-96-00229-CV, 1999 WL 12739, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 14,
1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
42
Id.
43
See id. at *2.
44
See id. at *3.
45
See id.
37
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contribution of RDL.46 Subsequently, AON offered to buy-out RDL’s
interest in BSP for $1.8 million.47 However, CanAmerican blocked the
buy-out under a provision in the RDL partnership agreement that required
its approval for any sale in excess of $100,000.48
After the failed buy-out attempt, Riveraine lost its corporate charter
causing it to become ineligible as the general partner.49 This event
precipitated a vote by the limited partners to dissolve RDL and elect
CanAmerican to wind up RDL’s affairs.50 Signet and Riveraine opposed
this move.51
Eventually, by court-order, Lobb (who controlled
CanAmerican) was substituted as the wind-up trustee of RDL.52 In 1994,
Lobb was forced to sell off RDL’s interest in BSP to AON.53 Riveraine and
Signet then brought suit against AON, Lobb, and CanAmerican for breach
of a fiduciary duty.54 A jury found in favor of Riveraine and Signet on their
breach of fiduciary duty cause of action, but the trial court granted a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on these claims. 55 Riveraine and
Signet appealed.
As neither AON nor Lobb were parties to the limited partnership, the
court of appeals held that they owed no fiduciary duty to Riveraine or
Signet.56 As to CanAmerican, Riveraine and Signet contended that
CanAmerican’s failure to vote in favor of the initial buy-out agreement, and
its actions to remove Riveraine as general partner, somehow amounted to a
breach of a fiduciary duty.57 The court of appeals began its analysis of this
issue by reviewing what it viewed as a misleading jury instruction.58 The
trial court instructed that limited partners owed “each other a fiduciary duty

46

See id.
See id. at *4.
48
See id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
See id. at *5.
54
Id. at *1.
55
See id. at *1, *23.
56
See id.
57
See id. They also contended that CanAmerican lost its limited-partner status when it was
briefly made the general partner; however, all of the actions complained about were taken by
Lobb rather than CanAmerican. Id.
58
See id. at *8.
47
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as a matter of law,” but, as the court of appeals correctly noted, there
existed no authority under Texas case law at that time for such a
proposition.59 The court did not go so far as to say that no such duty can
ever exist between limited partners, but instead took its lead from other
jurisdictions which had found that no such duty exists unless the limited
partner “actively engages in control over the operation of the business so as
to create duties that otherwise would not exist.”60 The court then found that
though CanAmerican had voted against the initial buy-out offer by AON,
such actions were protected under the safe harbor provisions of the Texas
limited partner act, which provided that “a limited partner does not
participate in the control of the business by voting on the sale of an asset or
assets of the limited partnership or by voting on the admission, removal or
retention of the general partner.”61 Thus, like Crawford, the AON
Properties court placed some emphasis on the lack of control of a typical
limited partner in holding that no fiduciary duty exists simply by virtue of
limited partnership status.62 However, the AON Properties court went
slightly further in exploring the control issue by linking it to the safe harbor
provisions of the Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act that govern when
a limited partner is in control for reasons of liability to third parties.63

C. Cases Finding the Existence of a Fiduciary Duty
There have been two reported decisions exploring the duties owed by
limited partners to the limited partnership.64 Both have found that such a
duty existed.65 However, a review of the facts from both cases reveals that
the limited partners at issue were more than simple passive investors.
In Dunnagan v. Watson, three men, Dunnagan, Watson, and Lawley,
formed a limited partnership, Parker County’s Squaw Creek Downs, L.P.

59

See id. at *7.
Id. at *23.
61
Id. (quoting Act of May 28, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 375, § 96, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws
1516, 1588 (expired Jan. 1, 2010)). These same provisions were carried forward in the TBOC and
can be found in the RULPA. See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 153.103 (West Supp. 2010);
REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303 (amended 1985), 6 U.L.A. 505 (Supp. 1995).
62
See AON Props., 1999 WL 12739, at *23.
63
See id.
64
See generally Dunnagan v. Watson, 204 S.W.3d 30 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet.
denied); Zinda v. McCann St., Ltd., 178 S.W.3d 883 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. denied).
65
See Dunnagan, 204 S.W.3d at 47; Zinda, 178 S.W.3d at 890.
60
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(Downs, LP), for the purpose of acquiring and operating a racetrack.66 All
three men were limited partners with Dunnagan owning 49% interest and
Watson and Lawley each owning 24.5 %.67 The remaining 2% was owned
by Parker County III, Inc., a corporation formed by the three men to serve
as the general partner.68 All three men also served as officers in the
corporation, with Watson serving as President.69 The shares of the
corporation were apportioned 50% to Dunnagan and 25% each to Watson
and Lawley.70
Downs, LP had purchased a racetrack but was without a racing
license.71 While waiting to obtain one, Watson and Lawley proposed
opening a restaurant at the track.72 As Dunnagan opposed such a venture,
Watson and Lawley agreed to take on the expense of the restaurant
themselves, until such time as a license was obtained at which point the
restaurant could be taken over by Downs LP.73 The restaurant opened with
Watson’s parents running the operation.74 Despite the agreement that
Watson and Lawley would take on the expenses, Downs, LP ultimately
ended up paying for the utilities and other rental items and the restaurant
paid no rent to Downs LP.75
Eventually, the Racing Commission denied Downs, LP’s application for
a racing license and disputes began to arise between the partners.76
Ultimately, Lawley offered his interest in Downs, LP and the corporation to
Watson, but Watson purchased only some of Lawley’s shares.77 Dunnagan
purchased the remainder.78 Further disputes gave rise to litigation in which
Watson sued Dunnagan to maintain the status quo of Downs, LP, and
Dunnagan brought a cross-suit alleging, inter alia, that Watson breached his

66

Dunnagan, 204 S.W.3d at 35.
Id.
68
Id.
69
See id.
70
Id.
71
See id.
72
Id.
73
See id.
74
See id.
75
See id.
76
See id. at 36.
77
See id. at 36–37.
78
See id. at 37.
67
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fiduciary duties to Downs, LP.79 Specifically, Dunnagan alleged that
Watson had caused Downs, LP to allow his private restaurant venture to
operate rent free and take on expenses of the restaurant in violation of the
fiduciary duties owed by Watson.80 The case went to trial, and the jury
agreed with Dunnagan’s claim.81
The Fort Worth court of appeals reviewed the sufficiency of the
evidence to support Dunnagan’s breach of fiduciary duty claim.82 The
context of the claim was, what duties does a limited partner owe when that
partner also happens to be the president and a major shareholder in the
general partner corporation?83 Thus, this was not a case of a passive
investor in Downs, LP but a rather active partner. The court began its
analysis by citing the Texas Supreme Court case of Insurance Company of
North America v. Morris, as to when fiduciary duties arise.84 The relevant
language from the Morris case reads, “Fiduciary duties arise as a matter of
law in certain formal relationships, including attorney-client, partnership,
and trustee relationships.”85 The court’s reliance on this passage is
somewhat suspect, however, as the Morris case was not analyzing the
duties of limited partners, but rather whether a duty was owed by a surety to
investors in a limited partnership who had relied on misrepresentations of a
general partner about the surety’s review of the investment.86
Despite the court’s misplaced reliance on Morris, a closer look at the
court’s analysis reveals that, to find a duty, it drew not from general
partnership law but from corporate law.87 Indeed, the court followed the
Morris language with a further qualification that the term fiduciary
generally applies “‘to any person who occupies a position of peculiar
confidence towards another,’ refers to ‘integrity and fidelity,’ and
contemplates ‘fair dealing and good faith.’”88 Noting that the jury had been
instructed on the fiduciary duties owed by officers and directors of a
79

See id. at 37.
See id.
81
See id.
82
See id. at 44.
83
See id. at 37, 44.
84
See id. at 46.
85
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Morris, 981 S.W.2d 667, 674 (Tex. 1998).
86
Id. at 670–71, 674.
87
See Dunnagan, 204 S.W.3d at 46.
88
Id. (citing Daniel v. Falcon Interest Realty Corp., 190 S.W.3d 177, 185 (Tex.App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.)).
80
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corporation, the court conducted its analysis, recognizing that Watson and
his parents had incurred debt in the name of Downs, LP and also did not
pay rent for use of Downs, LP’s facilities. The court concluded that the
evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Watson had placed his own
personal interests ahead of Downs, LP in violation of his fiduciary duties,
but the holding rested on an instruction given to the jury which relied upon
corporate fiduciary duties.89 In other words, it appears that the fiduciary
duty arose, not by virtue of Watson’s status as a limited partner but by
virtue of his position as an officer in the corporate general partner.
In Zinda v. McCann Street, Ltd., Zinda, who was a limited partner in
McCann Street Ltd., sued the other limited partners, Kyle Smith, Trey
Smith, and Cheyenne Smith, as well as the general partner, McCann Street
General, Inc., for breach of fiduciary duties relating to the foreclosure of his
partnership interest.90 The corporate general partner was also controlled by
Kyle and Trey Smith.91 Zinda lost at trial, but on appeal only the general
partnership and Kyle and Trey Smith were named as appellees because
Zinda failed to appeal the directed verdict in favor of Cheyenne Smith.92
Thus, the only limited partners whose conduct was at issue were those also
in control of the limited partnership’s corporate general partner. The Zinda
court, however, did not make this distinction when it quoted the law
regarding when a fiduciary relationship arises.93 Citing to the same
language in Morris that the Dunagan court relied upon, the Zinda court
asserted that partners owe fiduciary duties to one another, but found that in
the case before them, those duties had been met.94 Given that the limited
partners also controlled the general partner, it is not necessarily true,
however, that this duty would have applied to a passive limited partner.

89

See id. at 46–47.
178 S.W.3d 883, 887 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. denied).
91
See id.
92
See id.
93
See id. at 890 (stating that “[f]iduciary duties arise as a matter of law in certain formal
relationships, including attorney-client, partnership, and trustee relationships”) (quoting Ins. Co.
of N. Am. v. Morris, 981 S.W.2d 667, 674 (Tex. 1998)).
94
Id. at 890–91.
90
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III. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF TEXAS LAW
A. The Duties of Limited Partners Under McBeth v. Carpenter
In McBeth v. Carpenter, a limited partnership called StoneLake Ranch,
L.P. was formed for the purpose of acquiring property in Travis County.95
The general partner was StoneLake Management, L.L.C., and Sandra
McBeth and James Reynolds were two of the limited partners in the
partnership.96 James Carpenter, who had induced McBeth and Reynolds
into entering the partnership, was the president of the general partner,
StoneLake Management, as well as the general partner in two limited
partnerships, Texas Water Solutions (TWS) and Texas Water Management
(TWM), which were themselves limited partners in the StoneLake Ranch
partnership.97 Ultimately, Carpenter purchased the same Travis County
property with other investors, but not McBeth or Reynolds, and was able to
resell the land at a profit.98 McBeth and Reynolds then sued Carpenter, as
well as TWS and TWM, for common law fraud and breach of fiduciary
duty.99 A jury found in favor of McBeth and Reynolds, and the defendants
appealed, among other things, the jury’s verdict that a fiduciary duty was
breached.100
On appeal, TWS and TWM argued that, as limited partners, they did not
owe a fiduciary duty to the other limited partners in the limited
partnership.101 In support for their argument, TWS and TWM cited
Crawford v. Ancira102 and AON Properties, Inc. v. Riveraine Corp.,103 two
cases which acknowledged that limited partners do not owe fiduciary duties
to each other.104 The Fifth Circuit dismissed the precedential value of these
95

565 F.3d 171, 175 (5th Cir. 2009).
Id.
97
Id. All told there were five limited partners, McBeth, Reynolds, Texas Water Solutions (of
which Carpenter was the general partner), Texas Water Management (of which Carpenter was
also the general partner), and two unnamed individuals. Id.
98
See id.
99
See id.
100
See id.
101
See id. at 177.
102
Crawford v. Ancira, No. 04-96-00078-CV, 1997 WL 214835, at *5 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio April 30, 1997, no writ) (not designated for publication).
103
AON Props., Inc. v. Riveraine Corp., No. 14-96-00229-CV, 1999 WL 12739, at *12 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 14, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
104
McBeth, 565 F.3d at 178, n.1.
96
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cases, however, because they were unpublished.105 The court instead turned
to what it purported was Texas law, stating that “Texas law recognizes such
[fiduciary] obligations between limited partners, applying the same
partnership principles that govern the relationship between a general partner
and limited partners.”106 Relying on Morris, Zinda, and Dunnagan, the
Fifth Circuit held that Texas courts make no distinction between the
fiduciary duties owed in a general partnership and a limited partnership.107
The court thus affirmed the verdict against TWS and TWM.108 Although
the court could have simply relied on the existence of their limited partner
status, the court went further in explaining the source of the duty:
While [TWS] and [TWM] argue that there was no evidence
at trial to show that a fiduciary relationship existed, the jury
was entitled to find otherwise in light of evidence that
Carpenter exerted control over StoneLake not just as
general partner of StoneLake Management but also in his
capacity as President of both Texas Water Solutions and
Texas Water Management. Notably, Carpenter’s trial
testimony indicated that he was often unable to identify
“which hat” he was wearing when performing various acts
related to StoneLake.109
Thus, it appears that if the court truly felt Texas law required only the
existence of a limited partnership to establish a fiduciary duty, it was not
confident enough in such an assertion to leave that as the naked basis of its
holding.
This reluctance is understandable from a review of the cases relied upon
by the Fifth Circuit. Though the court cited to Morris, Zinda, and
Dunagan, only Zinda, an appellate court case, truly goes so far as to say
limited partners owe a heightened fiduciary duty to each other. However,
based on the facts of each case, all three could be viewed as supporting a

105

Id. The Court did acknowledge, however, that even under AON Props., Inc., TWS and
TWM would not prevail because that case acknowledged that limited partners who engage in
control over the operation of the limited partnership can owe fiduciary duties to the limited
partnership. See id.
106
Id. at 177.
107
Id. at 177–78.
108
Id. at 179.
109
See id. at 178–79.
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more limited view of when such a duty arises, which is more in accord with
the spirit of TBOC and RULPA.
McBeth primarily relies upon the Texas Supreme Court decision of
Insurance Company of North America v. Morris,110 to support its contention
that Texas law makes no distinction between general partnerships and
limited partnerships with regard to fiduciary duties. The folly of
Dunnagan’s reliance on this phrase has been discussed above.111 McBeth’s
reliance has been similarly criticized:
The court noted parenthetically that Insurance Co. of North
America v. Morris was a case evaluating claims involving
limited partnerships, implying that the supreme court’s
statement regarding partner fiduciary duties was intended
to encompass limited partners; however, the supreme court
did not discuss or analyze the duties of limited partners in
that case.112
Given the facts present in Morris, it is likely that the statement
regarding fiduciary duties is more a case of the Texas Supreme Court
loosely referring to general partnerships as partnerships, and no inference
should be made that the term also should have included limited
partnerships. This distinction is important as McBeth, Dunnagan, and
Zinda all rely on this phrase.

B. Harmonizing McBeth and Texas Law
Though the McBeth court phrased Texas law as being polarized between
the two unreported cases of Crawford and AON Properties and the two
reported cases of Dunnagan and Zinda, the court’s ultimate ruling is in line
with the holdings of both pairs of cases. Though the Crawford and AON
courts found no fiduciary duty existed in their respective cases, the holdings
fall short of finding that no duty can ever exist. Indeed, AON Properties
looked to the issue of control to help buttress its holding that the limited
partner owed no such duty. But, in Dunnagan and Zinda, the limited
partners were in fact also in control of the limited partnership. Thus, just as

110

981 S.W.2d 667, 674 (Tex. 1998).
See supra notes 84-86.
112
19 HAMILTON, ET AL., supra note 19 at § 14.33 (2d ed. 2009) (emphasis added). As an
aside—the language appears to have been lifted due to its appearance in a head note from the
Morris case.
111
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the limited partners could have been found liable to third parties, the courts
found that this degree of control also gave rise to fiduciary duties owed to
the other limited partners, just as if the defendants were the general partners
(which happened to be the case in Zinda and McBeth). McBeth’s holding is
in conformity with both sets of cases as the defendant at issue was also, in
effect, the general partner.
The rule that should be gleaned from Texas law, therefore, is not that
there is an absolute rule that all limited partners owe fiduciary duties toward
the other partners and the partnership; nor is the rule that limited partners
never owe fiduciary duties. Rather, the inquiry should be a case-by-case
analysis of whether the limited partner is exercising a degree of control
sufficient to give rise to a fiduciary duty. Just as a shareholder in a
corporation does not automatically owe fiduciary duties to the other
shareholders, a passive investor in a limited partnership should likewise be
free from such duties. Further, just as the safe harbor provisions insulate
certain limited partner activities from giving rise to liability to third parties,
no fiduciary duties should arise from the limited partners taking part in such
activities as simply voting on matters or advising general partners.
Such an approach is consistent with approaches taken in other
jurisdictions, including Delaware.113 Indeed, the court in Bond Purchase,
L.L.C. v. Patriot Tax Credit Properties, L.P., faced a similar confusion over
the duties owed by limited partners in a limited partnership.114 There, an
assignee115 of a limited partnership interest, Bond Purchase, L.L.C. (Bond),
sued the limited partnership, Patriot Tax Credit Properties, L.P. (Patriot),
after Patriot refused to hand over a list of its investors which Bond sought
to initiate a mini-tender offer to buy up to 4.9% of the outstanding shares.116
Patriot countered that Bond’s attempted mini-tender offer was adverse to
113
See Williamson v. Kay (In re Villa W. Assocs.), 146 F.3d 798, 806–07 (10th Cir. 1998);
Herzog v. Leighton Holdings, Ltd. (In re Kids Creek Partners, L.P.), 212 B.R. 898, 936–37
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997); Tri-Growth Ctr. City, Ltd. v. Silldorf, Burdman, Duignan & Eisenberg,
265 Cal. Rptr. 330, 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (“While a limited partner normally would not be
involved in the management or otherwise participate in the partnership . . . so as to incur fiduciary
obligations to other partners, we believe there can be factual scenarios where a limited partner
might be involved in the partnership in such a manner—for example, allowing him access to
confidential information—so as to create fiduciary duties.”).
114
See 746 A.2d 842, 863–64 (Del. Ch. 1999).
115
See id. at 847. While the assignee was not a full limited partner, assignees retained all of
the economic rights and most of the ownership rights except record ownership and the right to
vote directly on matters before the limited partnership. Id. at 847.
116
See id. at 848.
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the interests of the limited partnership and the other investors and therefore
was a violation of the fiduciary duty owed by Bond, as a limited partner, to
the other investors.117 In doing so, Patriot relied upon the same linkage
issue with general partnership law that has seemingly caused some
confusion under Texas law.118 The Delaware Chancery Court clarified,
however, that a finding of such a fiduciary duty on the part of a limited
partner had only been established under Delaware law in those limited
circumstances “in which a ‘partnership agreement empowers a limited
partner discretion to take actions affecting the governance of the limited
partnership.’”119 The court noted that the partnership agreement granted
Bond no such governance powers or a right to manage or control the
partnership and thus Bond owed no fiduciary duties.120 In coming to this
conclusion, the court analogized the situation to that of a minority
shareholder in a corporation stating, “Bond’s mini-tender offer is akin to a
minority shareholder making a mini-tender offer for a corporation’s stock—
an action to which fiduciary duties would not normally apply.”121
Similar to the result in Bond Purchase, L.L.C., the Texas cases which
have found a duty was owed appear to rely upon factual scenarios in which
the limited partner exerted a greater degree of control than one would
expect from a passive investor. Thus, the results avoid running afoul of the
TBOC’s provisions that the “powers and duties of a limited partner shall
not be governed by [rules applicable to general partnerships] that would be
inconsistent with the nature and role of a limited partner”122 and the further
provision that a “limited partner shall not have any obligation or duty of a
general partner solely by reason of being a limited partner.”123 This is not
to say that control is the only means by which a limited partner could owe a
fiduciary duty. Certainly scenarios that implicate agency law could give
rise to liability and the Dunnagan court’s analysis seems to leave the door
open for liability to arise by virtue of status as an officer in a corporate
general partner.124 However, such other theories are beyond the scope of
117

See id. at 863.
See id.
119
See id. at 864 (quoting KE Prop. Mgmt. Inc. v. 275 Madison Mgmt. Corp., 1993 WL
285900, at *9 (Del. Ch. July 27, 1993) (not designated for publication)).
120
See id.
121
See id.
122
TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 153.003(b) (West Supp. 2010).
123
Id. at § 153.003(c).
124
Due to the language used in Dunnagan and the reliance on a jury instruction, it is unclear
118
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this article. For present purposes, it is clear that limited partner status alone
does not create fiduciary duties under Texas law.

V.

CONCLUSION

The bold pronouncement of the McBeth court coupled with the loose
citations by Texas courts to the Texas Supreme Court case of Morris have
led to an unfortunate and inaccurate statement of Texas law with regard to
limited partners’ fiduciary duties. No doubt a number of attorneys will read
the easily quoted language and assume liability exists without carefully
examining the cases upon which McBeth relied or the factual scenarios that
have led to liability. However, a review of the case law reveals that, rather
than limited partner status per se leading to fiduciary duties, the Texas rule
is far more nuanced. Fiduciary duty liability can attach to a limited partner,
but the rule that is to be taken from Texas case law is that such liability
arises when the limited partner exerts control over the limited partnership to
justify extending such liability. In determining whether a limited partner’s
actions rise to such a level as to impose a fiduciary duty, the safe harbor
provisions of the TBOC for when a limited partner will be liable to third
parties may be instructive.125 Such an approach is more consistent with the
provisions of the TBOC and the expectations of the parties in forming a
limited partnership.

whether the decision indicates an adoption of such liability. Such a theory would be based upon
the following reasoning: as the officers and directors of a corporation owe fiduciary duties to the
corporation and as the general partner corporation itself owes fiduciary duties to the limited
partners and the limited partnership, the officers and directors thus also owe fiduciary duties to the
limited partners and limited partnership. See In re USACafes, L.P. Litig., 600 A.2d 43, 48–49
(Del. Ch. 1991) (relying by analogy, in part, on the law of trusts to find such a fiduciary duty).
125
See TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE ANN. § 153.103.

